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Historical consciousness among Americans today does not run very deep. 
We tend to confront each public issue as though it was emerging for the first 
time, divorced from the earlier history of the nation. Contemporary debate on 
the relationship between church, state and school is no exception. 
When history is called in at all, it is usually for rhetorical purposes. 
Those arguing against school prayer or tuition tax credits go to great lengths 
to cast Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and other founders of the American 
nation as largely secularized "free thinkers," or as Deists "at worst." Those 
pressing for enhanced religious presence in elementary and secondary schools 
commit similar sins. For example, the over-zealous publisher of one otherwise-
respectable book on the framers of the Constitution, placed on his dustcover the 
claim that "50 (and perhaps 52) of the 55 Framers of the United States Constitu-
tion were Christians. Not humanists, not Deists, not agnostics — Christians!" 
The Secularization of American Education 
Fortunately, amidst the smoke, there is occasional light. Perhaps the most 
useful book on the subject is still the slim volume written in 1912 by legal 
scholar Samuel Windsor Brown. Entitled The Secularization of American Educa-
tion, the book avoids descent into the vast controversial literature bearing 
epithets such as "Godless public schools" or "stunted religious minds." Dr. 
Brown makes the eminently reasonable statement that "state legislation, state 
constitutional provisions and state supreme court decisions seem best suited to 
give us the matured judgment of our people as a whole on this matter."1 
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What did he find in his comprehensive review of such evidence? Laws from 
the colonial and early national period, Professor Brown concluded, show the 
close connection of church and school and of religion and education. They 
reveal "the largely religious aim of education, the largely religious nature of 
the subject matter of instruction, and the considerable part played by the 
church in the control of schools." When the United States was founded, the his-
torical record shows, church and school were closely bound together and there is 
no convincing evidence that the founders of this nation, taken as a whole, 
intended for the situation to be otherwise. 
The great shift in direction, Brown asserted, came about 1850 when state 
predominance in educational affairs began to supplant that of the church. "The 
dominant aim of the school becomes a civic one," Brown wrote, "the subject mat-
ter of instruction is purged of everything savoring of a sectarian or denomina-
tional religious nature, and control shifts from the church and her ministry to 
the state and her officials." State constitutional provisions emerged denying 
the diversion of tax funds to religious educational claimants. By 1912, no less 
than thirty-five states had enacted specific provisions against sectarian relig-
ious instruction or the use of textbooks containing religious materials in state 
supported schools. The reading of the Bible was still provided for in the laws 
of fourteen states, but even this provision was frequently limited by require-
ments that such reading be unaccompanied by any commentary and that those who 
objected to the Bible being read must be excused from the room. 
This secularization of public education, Professor Brown insisted, repre-
sented but one phase of the separation of ecclesiastical from civil power, a 
recurring theme in this country's history since the early colonial days. "The 
American States," Brown noted in closing, now held "unbounded confidence in 
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their ability to educate for their purposes." More recent Federal court deci-
sions on state aid to private schools, while commonly drawing on Constitutional 
arguments resting in historically dubious interpretations of the First and Four-
teenth amendments, have not significantly deviated from the political consensus 
Brown described. 
Yet, as Professor Brown himself hinted, this dramatic shift in educational 
philosophy and structure after 1850 had deeper roots. Not coincidentally, this 
turn accompanied the dramatic change in immigration patterns that the United 
States experienced in the same decade. Before 1850, the large majority of new 
immigrants to America continued to come from England, Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales and, to a lesser degree, from Germany. The Anglo-Saxon predominance 
in politics, culture and religion continued to be undergirded by sheer numbers. 
Beginning in that decade, though, new waves of immigrants began flowing in from 
Ireland, Scandinavia, Italy, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Between 1845 and 1930, 
nearly fifty million non-English speaking persons poured into the United States. 
The creation of a national railway network over the same years accelerated their 
spread across the the Midwest and West. The various states correspondingly 
faced a wholly new problem: the assimilation of this polyglot mass, represent-
ing many distinct cultures and religions, into a standard American identity. 
The schools became the states' major vehicle for integrating immigrant children, 
and through them their parents, into the mainstream. Hence, the civic need to 
build minimum degrees of social and national unity replaced the educators' more 
traditional concern with passing on a distinct moral-religious heritage. 
Nonetheless, while necessarily abandoning sectarian doctrine in pursuing 
this integrative task, it is critical to note that the schools continued to 
embody and present a common value scheme to their students. It was a code still 
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firmly rooted in the nonconformist Puritan heritage and in the Ten Commandments, 
albeit stripped of religious terminology. The code embodied what the 19th-
century understood as the "bourgeois," middle-class or Victorian virtues. No 
less a proponent of the "new education" than John Dewey, in his fundamental work 
Democracy and Education, stressed that "[c]ertain traits of character have such 
an obvious connection with our social relationships that we call them 'moral' in 
an emphatic sense—truthfulness, honesty, chastity, amiability, etc 
They are moral in an emphatic sense . . . because they are so intimately con-
nected with thousands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly recognize. 
Elsewhere, Dewey added the "natural" relations of "husband and wife, of parent 
and child" to his list of clear and self-evident moral attributes.^ America's 
secularized schools, like Dewey himself, rested within a cultural matrix that 
bonded "chastity" and "family" to "honesty" and "amiability" as the virtues upon 
which all reasonable people could agree. Thus, even when stripped of distinctly 
religious sentiments and language, the public schools of this era remained emi-
nently Victorian or bourgeois, living off what historian Arnold Toynbee once 
called the accumulated moral capital of traditional religious and moral philos-
ophy. 
A Divisive Debate Continues 
The question arises: If the public schools had been effectively secularized 
by the turn of the century—over eighty years ago—why is this nation still fac-
ing bitterly divisive debates over issues like school prayer and government aid 
to private and church-related schools? There are, I believe, three reasons: 
1. The resilience of the remaining church schools. 
While the large majority of American children were in state schools by the 
early 1900s, two significant segments of the more recent immigration—Roman 
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Catholics and a hefty portion of German-American Lutherans—retained their com-
mitment to religiously based primary education. For somewhat different reasons, 
both groups resisted the social integration efforts of the public schools. 
Since the mid-1960s, a rapidly growing number of orthodox Jewish, fundamental-
ists, Baptist, Pentacostal and "generic" Christian schools have—for complex, 
widely varying and occasionally less-than-uplifting reasons—sprung up through-
out the country. Quite simply, these groups represent a political force of some 
potency, and one unwilling to accept the essentially political decisions about 
state funding of church schools made nearly a century ago. 
2. The necessity of religion in the schools. 
To emphasize the complexity of this brief statement, let me present a pair 
of quotations. The first: "Education is the modern universal purveyor, and 
upon the schools shall rest the responsibility for seeing to it that we recover 
our threatened religious heritage." 
And the second: "The way we think of ourselves and our neighbors and the 
innermost motivations that inspire and promote these relations become the unify-
ing or disintegrating forces of society. Religion is a spiritual process of 
union, the question being whether the unifying bond be God and His laws or some 
pragmatically established ethos." 
The first of these quotations, affirming the necessity of religion in the 
schools, comes—surprisingly—from John Dewey in his 1908 essay "Religion and 
Our Schools."4 The second quote, affirming the need for some common, socially 
integrative value base, comes from the Jesuit scholar Joseph Costanzo, whose 
1964 book This Nation Under God remains one of the better Roman Catholic argu-
ments for a renewal of religiously based education.^ What's going on here? 
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To begin with, it is true that Dewey had his own definition of the word 
"religion." In the essay cited above, for example, he dismissed any return to 
the traditional religious ideas which he believed science had undermined or to 
those old religious symbols "which have been emptied of their content of obvious 
meaning." Instead, Dewey attempted to separate "religious experience" from 
doctrinal "religion," hoping thereby to save man's recognition "of some unseen 
higher power . . . having control of his destiny" from the dead hand of the 
traditional churches. Dewey consequently called on "the positive creed of life 
implicit in democracy and in science" to turn its energies towards "the control 
of the things of the spiritual life."^ 
For his part, Father Costanzo recognized the critical role of both the Amer-
ican educational system and shared religious values in pulling the nation 
together. "Other countries have been held together by culture, tradition or 
race," he wrote. "Our Republic has rested on a common will to live together 
through ethnic diversity, racial distinctions, even through the plurality of 
religious beliefs . . . . The uniqueness of the American experience has been 
that men of different faiths have confessed to a core of religious and moral 
truths which are an integral part of their own distinctive creed."7 
In the abstract sense, I believe, Dewey would not have disagreed. "Our 
schools," Professor Dewey once wrote, "in bringing together those different 
nationalities, languages, traditions, and creeds . . . are performing an infi-
nitely significant religious work. They are promoting the social unity out of 
which in the end genuine religious unity must grow."® 
In sura, both Dewey and Costanzo agreed on the absolute need for a kind of 
religion in the schools. Moreover, they agreed on the core values which the 
schools, public and private, must support—including chastity, family solidarity, 
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truth fulness, and amiability. Their disagreement came over the foundation for 
those common values. Costanzo saw their roots in the still viable, common 
Judeo-Christian heritage of most Americans. Dewey emphasized the failure of the 
churches to answer the challenge of modernization and saw these values hanging 
in thin air. He hoped to rebuild a foundation for them through his new religion 
of democracy and science. 
It is important to note, though, that in pursuing his task, Dewey came at 
the tail end of a long line of philosophers involved in what one writer has 
called "The Enlightenment Project." By the mid-1600s, a core of leading North-
ern European philosophers had reached the collective opinion that Chrisitianity, 
as received doctrine, was no longer capable of supporting moral order in Western 
society. The content of morality remained clear to these new philosophers. 
Just as with Dewey in a later century, marital fidelity, family, sexual 
restraint, promise keeping, and justice were the unquestioned core of moral 
life. But revealed religion, in the philosophers' minds, no longer seemed able 
to maintain these virtues. Instead, the Enlightenment figures began a search 
for an independent, rational foundation for social morality. It was a task that 
consumed about 200 years. Dewey's effort to create what he called "a common 
faith" supporting morality on the techniques of democracy and science was merely 
one more expression of this centuries-old search. But like the efforts of his 
predecessors—among them, David Hume, Denis Diderot and Immanuel Kant—Dewey's 
attempt ultimately failed. 
Which brings the argument to: 
3. The collapse of the Victorian consensus. 
It is difficult for modern, self-styled pragmatic Americans to accept that 
our current social and educational disarray might stem in large part from the 
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debates and failures of philosophers in centuries past. Yet I believe that they 
do. 
The fatal flaw in Dewey's argument on morals and religion, for example, liej? 
deeply embedded within the overall failure of The Enlightenment Project. Space 
does not permit a full explanation of the sources of this failure. Alasdair 
Maclntyre's recent study After Virtue9 does so in detail. Indeed, it is one 
of the most important books that has appeared in recent decades. I do want, 
however, to look at the specific philosophical problem that Dewey faced, one 
which he was unable to solve. 
As noted, Dewey shared with other late Victorians—indeed with virtually all 
secularized Western thinkers shaped during the 19th-century—a commitment to a 
core of common values. For them, the "content" of morality was clear, natural, 
and self-evident. As Dewey wrote, justice, affection and truth were "so assured 
in [their] hold upon humanity" that it was unnecessary for humankind to encumber 
itself with religious dogma. Rational human beings, he believed, could agree on 
"ideal ends." "There is at least enough impulse toward justice, kindliness, and 
order," Dewey wrote, "so that if it were mobilized for action, . . . the dis-
order, cruelty, and oppression that exist would be reduced. 
Clearly, Dewey's faith in the ability of human reason, or science, to agree 
on common "ends" and "values" for mankind is a direct descendant of philosopher 
Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative," the belief that human reason would 
generate moral principles that ought to be held by all men and women. Even 
before Dewey's birth, though, the fatal logical inconsistencies of Kant's work 
were drawn out in Danish theological Soren Kierkegaard's 1842 book Enten-Eller. 
Some decades later, German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche put the final nails 
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into the coffin of Kantian rational morality. As Nietzsche wrote in his volume, 
The Gay Science: 
You admire the categorical imperative within you? This "firmness" of 
your so-called moral judgment? This "unconditional" feeling that here 
everyone must judge as I do? Rather admire your selfishness at this point. 
And the blindness, pettiness, and frugality of your selfishness. For it is 
selfish to experience one's own judgment as a universal law . . . . Anyone 
who still judges "in this case everybody would have to act like this" has 
not yet taken five steps toward self-knowledge.1 * 
Above what he saw as the ruins of both Christian morality and The Enlighten-
ment Project, Nietzsche then proceeded to define the new philosophical impera-
tive. "Let us therefore limit ourselves," he declared, 
to the purification of our opinions and valuations and to the creation of 
our own new tables of what is good, and let us stop brooding about the 
"moral value of our actions"! Yes, my friends, regarding all the moral 
chatter of some about others it is time to feel nauseous . . . . Let us 
leave such chatter and such bad taste to those who have nothing else to do 
but drag the past a few steps further through time . . . . We, however, 
want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, 
who give themselves laws, who create themselves. 
For Nietzsche, not only the morality of God, but the morality of reason, too, 
was dead. In place of both "Christian man" and "rational man" stood the radi-
cal, unbound individual. Consequently, there was nothing left to morality but 
the expression of each individual's desires, passions and will. Moral judgments 
had become, in Nietzsche's world, functions of whim and power. 
As Maclntyre suggests, Nietzsche has emerged as the moral philosopher of our 
modern age. His radical individualism has come to infect our bureaucratic and 
managerial cultures as well as those irrational social movements of both the 
left and the right which periodically shake Western society: the "spiritual" 
fascism of the 1930s as well as the student radicalism of the 1960s. Moreover, 
I would add that the great danger facing the American educational enterprise 
today is not, as some maintain, the dominance of Dewey's brand of secular human-
ism, nor, as others argue, the threatened return of religious indoctrination to 
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th e schools. Both the Victorian-humanistic and Judeo-Christian systems, despite 
the deep and profound differences between them, recognize the same content of 
morality—sexual continence, family values, honesty and justice—and both agree 
that the schools have a responsibility to reinforce these values for children. 
Instead, the great danger confronting our schools is the slow, quiet spread of 
the moral nihilism of Nietzsche into every corner of our lives. 
Not only do we Americans suffer from a deficiency in historical conscious-
ness; our memories also tend to be short. As late as the 1950s and early 1960s, 
the Victorian or bourgeois code of behavior, once celebrated as self-evident by 
Dewey, supplied Americans with their core of common values. Social analyst 
Daniel Yankelovich, assessing polling data from this era, found "an extra-
ordinary cohesion" among Americans resting on shared familial and moral values. 
These included maintenance of an intact family, a good home, civic responsi-
bility, and adherence to a sexual code focused on marriage and children.^ 
America's schools—both public and parochial—strongly undergirded these values 
as unifying, democratic and moral constructs, a fact which a look at any grade-
school reader or curriculum from the 1950s would confirm. 
However, that consensus came under assault over the course of the 1960s and 
it had collapsed altogether by the mid-1970s. Examples of this attack would 
include the work of sociologist Robert Harper, who demanded in 1971 a "block-
buster intensive therapeutic" federal program to help children "overcome the 
contamination and crippling of their sexual beings by our culture." He called 
on parents to "encourage, help, and foster" sexual play among their preadoles-
cent children. "To prevent sexual hang-ups in interactional as well as mastur-
batory sex," Harper concluded, "we have to start when children are barely tod-
dlers."14 More subtly, psychologist Larry Constantine argued in a 1971 
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teacher education book for the training of children in alternative life-styles. 
"We must inform young people of the enormous range of alternatives open to them," 
Constantine wrote, "and fairly, without prejudice, provide them with the basis 
for rational choices of what might be most fulfilling to them . . . ." He 
continued: "We must abolish stereotypes of fidelity and nonfidelity, marital 
and extramarital, heterosexual and homosexual."^ In a surprisingly short 
time, such ideas emerged triumphant. Indeed, it appears that most courses in 
public schools today that deal, directly or indirectly, with sexuality and 
family life have come to adopt this nonjudgmental, supermarket approach to 
values and lifestyles. 
There are historical reasons and there may be sound arguments for this edu-
cational approach. It is a fundamental error, however, to consider techniques 
such as "value clarification" or goals such as "self-fulfillment" to be within 
the tradition of John Dewey. As a man rooted in the manners of the 19th century 
and as one committed to the unquestioned central values of marital fidelity, 
sexual restraint and family life, the classic Dewey would—I suggest—be shocked 
by and opposed to such practices. For the radical individualism and the denial 
of common social values implicit in such moral anarchy undercuts the cultural 
and epistemological foundations of Dewey's educational and social philosophy. 
Values clarification and similar techniques aimed at moral individualism are not 
expressions of the secular liberal ideal; they are Nietzschean or socially 
nihilistic, to their core. Paraphrasing Plato, schools may not be able to teach 
virtue—but it is clear that they can reinforce or undermine virtuous behavior. 
Today, many of our schools—instead of serving as the critical unifying force in 
society—have tended to become prime engines for national disintegration, 
encouraging through absolute value relativism the emergence of thousands of 
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moral-ethical ghettos within the United States, even a cynicism towards social 
morality altogether. No result could be further removed from the vision held up 
by Professor Dewey. 
Diversity and Democracy 
I do not celebrate this result. In fact, I look upon the situation we face 
with great sorrow, even dread. More than ever before, our society needs strong 
vehicles for social integration. Yet most voices on the left celebrate a nation 
"exploding with diversity." On the right, one conservative educator, Lucy 
Patterson, notes that "[i]n a society as incredibly diverse as late twentieth-
century America, the only way we can all live at peace with one another is to 
take volatile issues like feminism, sex education, and creationism out of the 
'winner take all' arena of monopoly education." Unless moral-ethical minorities 
have the option to send children to schools consistent with their beliefs, she 
suggests, "the politics of public education will keep growing harsher, shriller, 
and more depressing."1^ I fear that Professor Patterson is right. 
Given the realities of contemporary cultural ferment and deep division, I 
believe it is time to implement alternatives to the existing educational 
structure. This time of challenge demands a new burst of creativity and experi-
mentation, in the hope that such a free competition of fresh ideas and disparate 
values might in the future result in a new synthesis and measure of unity. 
Specifically, a joint program of tuition tax credits and vouchers would open 
all elements of the population, not just the relatively wealthy, to the contem-
porary imperative of choice in education. In this respect, tax credits and 
vouchers become the vehicles for true equality and democracy in the late 20th 
century. A Federal income tax credit for a portion of tuition paid to private 
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schools would assist middle-income families in the exercise of such choice. 
While a full-fledged voucher scheme, distributing education funds directly to 
children's parents, is beyond the resources of the Federal Treasury, considera-
tion should be given to a voucher plan aimed specifically at the poor. Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, for example, could be 
restructured to parcel out the approximately $3 billion involved directly to the 
parents of disadvantaged children, leaving each family free to spend its voucher 
at the public or private school of its choice. Both tuition tax credit and 
voucher schemes should and could be structured to prohibit support for private 
schools which discriminate on the basis of race, without violating the schools' 
right to due process. While it is true that recent Supreme Court decisions have 
tended to overturn certain state tax-credit and related plans that indirectly 
aid church-related schools, there is no certainty that the court would overturn 
a carefully constructed Federal plan. Indeed, the court's recent 5-4 decision 
upholding a Minnesota statute that allows parents to take tax deductions for 
educational costs incurred at private or public schools suggests a basic turn in 
its approach to the church-state-education question. 
It is clear that such a plan would fundamentally change the educational 
enterprise. Many educators understandably react to that prognosis with fear, 
even panic. Might I note in closing, though, that such a time would also offer 
unprecedented opportunities for experimentation, imagination, creativity, 
growth, and renewed progress in educational theory, endeavors certainly in 
accord with the spirit—if possibly not with the letter—of John Dewey. 
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